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MAIL FRAUD AND THE GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE
INTRODUCTION
Fraud is one of the most serious problems facing America
today.l Federal prosecutors often utilize the mail fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1341,2 to combat the crime of fraud.3 Government
prosecutors use this statute because it may be broadly
I See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115 n.9 (1988) (holding that white-collar
crime is serious problem in America); SEC v. Gallard, 1997 WL 767570, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (stating that SEC has submitted report to Bureau of International Chamber of
Commerce describing rising problem of securities fraud); see also G. Robert Blakey, The
Rico Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NORTE DAME L.
REV. 237, 341 (1982) (citing 1974 study that fraud crimes cost Americans 40 billion
dollars); Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate and White Collar Crime: Simplifying the Ambiguous,
31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 392 (1994) (discussing fact that federal government had made
white collar crime priority).
2 See 18 U.S.C. 1341 (1998) states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away,
distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated
or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office deposits or causes
to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or
commercial interstate carrier, or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed
to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If the
violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
Id.
3 See Elkan Abramowitz, 'Intent to Harm' in the Federal Statute on Mail Fraud May
5, 1998 N.Y.L.J 3 (col. 1) (stating that statute "remains one of the most potent and flexible
weapons in the federal prosecutors arsenal..."); see also James J. Graham, Mischarging:
A Contract Cost Dispute or a Criminal Fraud?, 15 PUB. CONT. L.J. 208, 222-23 (1985)
(discussing how broad interpretation of definition of fraud has justified federal
prosecution in various situations); Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government By
Prosecutorial Decree: The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 147 (1990)
(stating how Justice Winter's dissent in United States v. Margiotta underscores concern
about ambiguous language of mail fraud statute which allows broad government
discretion).
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interpreted.4 To convict a defendant of mail fraud, the
prosecution must prove "(1) the existence of a scheme to defraud
that (2) involved use of the mails for the purpose of executing the
scheme. The evidence must demonstrate (3) the defendant had
the specific intent to commit fraud."5
Historically, courts struggled with the interpretation of the
statute.6 Throughout its 100-year history, both Congress and the
courts have subjected the mail fraud statute to various
interpretations. 7 Yet despite this uncertainty, the courts continue
to give federal prosecutors wide prn.seutnrinl nnwer under this
statute.8  Although this prosecutorial power is seemingly
4 See United States v. Curry, 681 F. 137, 147 (1990) (holding that language of mail
fraud statute is flexible enough to encompass any conduct failing to reflect honesty and
fair play in business world); Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967)
(holding that crime of mail fraud is broad in scope and condemns any conduct which fails
to reflect "moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play, and right dealing in
general business life of members in society (quoting Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d
104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958); see also Williams, supra note 3, at 137 (stating that mail fraud
statute is government's weapon in fight against crime); James Bucci, Comment, Criminal
Law-Liberal Interpretation of the Causation of Mail Fraud Statute- United States v.
Bartnovsky, 879 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1989), 63 TEMP. L. REV. 893, 893 (1990) (stating courts
have applied mail fraud statute expansively).
5 See United v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Goss, 650
F.2d 1336, 1341 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Freeman, 619 F.2d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir.
1980); see also United States v. Moser, 123 F.3d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
government must prove beyond reasonable doubt scheme to defraud specific intent to
defraud, and use of mails in furtherance of scheme); United States v. Kent, 608 F.2d 542,
546 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that scheme to defraud involves use of mails which is for
purpose of executing scheme and that specific intent to defraud is implicit in mail fraud
statute).
6 See United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 442 (1917)(finding that use of mails
prior to and one step toward receipt of fruits of fraud violate statute under broad
interpretation of words "cause to be placed"); United States v. Durland, 161 U.S. 306, 313
(1896) (increasing power of mail fraud statute). But see Parr v. United States, 363 U.S.
370, 389, 390 (1960) (holding that mailing has to be essential part of the scheme); Kann v.
United States, 323 U.S. 88, 94 (1949) (restricting power of mail fraud statute by holding
that mailing was too remote).
7 See Act of March 2, 1889, ch., 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873 (stating specific examples of
which instances court used to explain mail fraud); see also United States v. Edwards, 458
F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding "[s]tatutes like the federal mail fraud statute
involved here must be strictly construed in order to avoid extension beyond the limits
intended by Congress"). But see 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1998) (stating that mail fraud statute
can be used for deprivation of an intangible property right); Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611
F.2d 1170, 1178 (6th Cir. 1979) (stating that mail fraud statute has been interpreted more
broadly since Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, 25 Stat. 873); United States v. Serlin, 538
F.2d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that mail fraud statute "is a broad proscription of
behavior for purposes of protecting society").
8 See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (requiring only that deprivation be only of intangible property);
see also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 364-66 (1987) (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(stating that elements of mail fraud statute should be read independently because
Congress enacted mail fraud statue to protect misuse of Postal Service); Williams, supra
note 3, at 147 (detailing broad government interpretation under mail fraud statute).
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limitless, defendants can assert a good faith defense to a mail
fraud charge, which acts as a complete defense to mail fraud
prosecution.9 A good faith defense does not impose a burden of
persuasion on the part of the defendant because, theoretically, it
negates the charge of a specific intent to defraud.10 In spite of the
integral role the good faith defense plays in a defendant's case,11
the circuits are split as to whether a defendant is entitled to a
separate good faith jury instruction. 12
Part I of this note will give a brief history of the origins of the
mail fraud statute and review the various statutory
interpretations the Supreme Court has given the mail fraud
statute. Part II will examine the Supreme Court's inability to
articulate a consistent rule regarding the connection between the
elements of a scheme to defraud and the use of the mail. Part III
examines the recent developments concerning the application
and interpretation of the mail fraud statute. Part IV will
demonstrate the need for a separate good faith jury charge in
light of the broad power given to prosecutors.
9 See United States v. Rossomado, 144 F.3d 197, 201 (2d. Cir. 1997) (holding that good
faith defense is appropriate defense); see also United States v. Wall, 130 F.3d 739, 746
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding that since mail fraud is specific intent crime, good faith defense is
complete defense); United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541, 549 (2d Cir. 1991) (recognizing
that good faith defense is complete defense to mail fraud charge); Steiger v. United
States, 373 U.S. 133 (10th Cir. 1967) (holding that good faith defense "is a complete
defense"); Coleman v. United States, 167 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1948) (holding that
question of intent is paramount because good faith defense is complete defense).
10 See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 738 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that
burden of proof is not on defendant to prove his good faith); United States v. Read, 658
F.2d 1225, 1239 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that although defendant put forth some evidence
of good faith, burden of proof is always on defendant); see also Adam H. Kurland,
Prosecuting 01' Man River: The Fifth Amendment, the Good Faith Defense, and the Non-
Testifying Defendant, 51 U. PIrT L. REV. 841, 856 (1990) (stating that good faith defense
does not impose burden of persuasion on defendant).
11 See Rossomado, 144 F.3d at 201 (stating that absent intent to defraud, there is no
crime); Wall, 130 F.3d at 746 (holding that defendant is entitled to good faith instruction
when evidence warrants it); Alkins, 925 F.2d at 549 (holding that good faith defense is
complete defense to mail fraud charge); Coleman, 167 F.2d at 839 (holding that question
of intent is "a paramount issue").
12 See United States v. Dockray, 943 F.2d 152, 155 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that
defendant is not entitled to separate good faith instruction); United States v. Rochester,
898 F.2d 971, 978 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that failure to instruct on good faith is not fatal
when jury is given detailed instruction on specific intent and defendant has had
opportunity to argue good faith to jury). But see United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716,
718 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that when defense of good faith has been interposed,
defendant is entitled to instruction directly on issue provided there is sufficient evidence).
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I. HISTORIcAL BACKGROUND OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
In 1868, Congress enacted legislation that prohibited using the
mail to send letters or circulars for lotteries. 13 Several years
later, in 1872, Congress enacted legislation that became the
predecessor of the modern mail fraud statute. 14 The legislation
made it a misdemeanor for "any person having devised or
intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or be
effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence or
communication with any other person.., by means of the post-
office establishment of the United States ... [.])1 5 in Ex Parte
Jackson,16 the Supreme Court determined the extent of Congress'
power to regulate the mail.17 The Court held, pursuant to Article
I, §8 of the Constitution, that Congress acted within its right to
create a criminal statute to protect the postal system. 18 Although
13 See Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194, 196 (stating that "it shall not
be lawful to deposit in a post office.., any letters or circulars concerning lotteries, so
called gift concerts, or other similar enterprises .... ); see also Jeffrey J. Dean & Doye E.
Green, Jr., McNally v. United States and Its Effect of the Federal Mail Fraud Statute: Will
White Collar Criminals Get a Break?, 39 MERCER L. REV. 697, 698-700 (1988) (discussing
history of mail fraud statute); John J. O'Connor, Note, McNally v. United States:
Intangible Right Mail Fraud Declared a Dead Letter, 37 CATH U. L. REV. 851, 858 (1988)
(recognizing that 1868 marked Congress's first attempt to control use of mails); Jed S.
Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 781-782 (1980)
(stating that 1868 act was "first small step toward prohibiting such 'illicit' uses of the
mails").
14 See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335 § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323; Ellen S. Podgor, Mail
Fraud: Opening Letters, 435 S.C. L. REV. 223, 225 (1992); see also Williams supra, note 3
at 137.
15 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335 §301, 17 Stat. 283, 323.
16 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
17 See Dean & Green, supra note 13, at 699 (discussing Supreme Court's handling
issue of statute's broad and vague wording in Ex Parte Jackson); G. Robert Blakey,
Federal Criminal Law: The Need not for Revised Constitutional Theory or New
Congressional Statutes, But the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutorial Discretion, 46
HASTING L. J. 1175, 1228 (1995) (stating that Supreme Court considered constitutionality
of closing mails to lottery materials in Exparte Jackson); Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme
Court and Freedom of Expression From 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 294-295
(1986) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court first seriously considered congressional power
over mail in Exparte Jackson"); Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called
Federal Fraud: The Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 443
(1995) (stating that "[s]ix years after the enactment of the mail fraud statute, the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the 1868 lottery law in Ex Parte
Jackson").
18 See Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 736-37 (holding that Congress' act imposing fines
on violators of lottery law was constitutional); see also Henning, supra note 17, at 443
(stating that Supreme Court had no problem allowing government to regulate mail
pursuant to Article I § 8 of the Constitution); see also Rakoff, supra note 13, at 787
(stating that Supreme Court decision left "no doubt as to the constitutionality of the mail
fraud statute").
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Ex Parte Jackson gave Congress the power to regulate the mail,
some courts attempted to limit the scope of activities
encompassed by statute. 19
Other courts held that for the mail fraud statute to apply there
must be a relationship between the mailing and the scheme. 20
These cases demonstrated that the mail fraud statute was
applicable when there was a clear link between the scheme to
defraud and the use of the mails.21 The necessity to demonstrate
a link between the scheme to defraud and the use of the mail
severely limited a prosecutor's ability to pursue crimes involving
mail fraud.22 As a result of the inconsistent decisions among
various courts, Congress amended the statute in 1889 and gave
specific examples of schemes to defraud.23 Courts, however, were
19 See United States v. Clark, 121 F. 190, 190-91 (M.D. Pa 1903) (holding that "not
every fraudulent scheme that use the mails are against federal law"); United States v.
Smith, 45 F. 561, 562 (E.D. Wis. 1891) (holding that making false representations through
newspapers is insufficient to form element of intent for mail fraud); United States v.
Mitchell, 36 F. 492, 493 (W.D. Pa. 1888) (holding that scheme to defraud insurance
company through mailing of premium after accident altering date of postage stamp not
covered under statute); see also Henning, supra note 17, at 443 (stating that after Ex
Parte Jackson, defendants still challenged mail fraud statute claiming that acts alleged in
indictments were outside scope of statute because of their "attenuated relation to the post
office").
20 See United States v. Watson, 35 F. 358, 359 (D.C.E.D. N.C. 1888) (holding that
placing of any letter in post-office in execution of scheme to defraud clearly fails under
statute); United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881, 885 (N.D. Ill. 1884) (holding that scheme to
defraud and use of mails to do so "is all which the rules of good pleading require"); United
States v. Jones, 10 F.469, 470 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1882) (holding that mailing of letter in
furtherance of scheme was sufficient evidence to prove mail fraud); see also Henning,
supra note 17, at 445 (stating that clear link between scheme and misuse of post office is
necessary).
21 See Watson, 35 F. at 359 (holding that placing mail in post-office helped execute
scheme); Loring, 91 F. at 885 (holding that use of mails was necessary to defraud
citizens); Jones, 10 F. at 470 (holding that defendants used mail to help circulate
counterfeit money).
22 See Henning, supra note 17, at 445 (stating that "insistence on a relationship
between the scheme and the misuse of the post office constituted a substantive limitation
on the Federal Government's power to prosecute crimes"); Geraldine Szoot Moohr, Mail
Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. LEGIS.
153, 159-60 (1993) (noting "[tihe original statute was grounded in the federal interest in
protecting the integrity of the mail, and this interest potentially limited the use of the
statute").
23 See Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873. The Act held that it was
unlawful to be involved in any schemes of:
[A]ny counterfeit or spurious coin, bank notes, paper money, or any obligation or
security of the United States or of any State, Territory, municipality, company,
corporation, or person.., or any scheme or artifice to obtain money by or through
correspondence, by what is commonly called "saw dust swindle," or "counterfeit
money fraud," or by dealing or pretending to deal in what is commonly called "green
articles," "green coin," "bills," "paper goods," "spurious Treasury notes," "United
States goods," "green cigars," or any other names or terms intended to be understood
1999]
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split in their interpretation of the amendment. While some
courts held that the amendment merely provided examples of
schemes to defraud,24 other courts held that the amendment
limited the use of the statute to those acts specifically mentioned
in its text. 25
II. INCONSISTENT JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
Despite the language of the amendment and lower court
precedent, the Supreme Court in Stokes v. United States26
rejected the restrictive interpretation of the amendment, and
held that the evidence necessary to be convicted of mail fraud
boiled down to three elements:
(1) That the persons charged must have devised a scheme or
artifice to defraud. (2) That they must have intended to effect
this scheme, by opening or intending to open correspondence
with some other person through the post office
establishment, or by inciting such other person to open
communication with them. (3) And that, in carrying out such
scheme, such person must have either deposited a letter or
packet in the post office, or taken or received therefrom. 27
In Durland v. United States, 28 the Court expanded the mail
fraud statute. 29 It held that the statute must be read to include
as relating to such counterfeit or spurious articles."
Id.
24 See Miller v. United States, 133 F. 337, 346 (8th Cir. 1904) (holding that 1889
amendment to mail fraud statute "retained the original denunciation against every
scheme or artifice to defraud"); Culp v. United States, 82 F. 990, 991 (3d Cir. 1897)
(stating that "the purpose of the amendment was not to restrict but to extend the
operation of the statute").
25 See United States v. Beach, 71 F. 160, 161 (D. Colo. 1895) (stating that "general
language of the act must be limited to such schemes and artifices as are ejusdem generis
with those named"); see also Henning, supra note 17, at 446 (stating that district court in
Beach "noted that the term 'scheme to defraud' might have covered the acts for which the
defendant was indicted, but because they were not similar to those described in the
amended mail fraud statute the indictment had to be dismissed").
26 157 U.S. 187 (1895).
27 See id. at 188-89; see also Rumble v. United States, 143 F. 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1906)
(reprinting and following Stokes test); Miller v. United States, 133 F. 337, 345 (8th Cir.
1904) (applying Stokes test).
28 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
29 See id. at 313 (holding that mail fraud statute is broad and should be read to
include various types of frauds); see also United States v. Coyle, 943 F.2d 424, 427 (4th Cir.
1991) (relying on Durland, court rejected restrictive reading); United States v. Farmer,
218 F. 929, 931 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1914) (holding that government can prosecute individual
who has developed general features of scheme to defraud provided it can be shown that
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"everything designed to defraud by representation as to the past
or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future."30 The
Court's interpretation enlarged the scope of what was a scheme
to defraud.
In 1909, Congress further amended the mail fraud statute.3 1
The amendment incorporated the language of Durland and made
punishable conduct that was performed for the purpose of
"obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises."32 In addition, Congress
eliminated language stating that a scheme "effected by either
opening or intending to open correspondence or communication
with any person ... by means of the post office establishment of
the United States."33
In its place, Congress stated that the mails had to be used "for
the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so
to do."34 Debate over the new amendment and the Supreme
Court decision focused on whether use of the mail in furtherance
of a scheme was a substantial limitation on the use of the mail
fraud statue or merely a jurisdictional requirement. 35
In 1914, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Young, 36 did
little to settle the dispute concerning the extent to which the
other elements of fraud would have been developed in execution of scheme); Henning,
supra note 17, at 446 (stating that fraudulent scheme element of statute should be read
broadly).
30 Durland, 161 U.S. at 313.
31 See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130; see also Henning,
supra note, 17 at 447 (stating that Congress amended mail fraud statute). See generally
Podgor, supra, note 14, at 227 (stating that Congress codified Court's interpretation of
statute).
32 See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, §215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130.
33 See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323; Moohr, supra note 22, at
59 (discussing evolution of mail fraud statute); see also Stacy Jaye Kanter, The Second
Circuit Review-1981-1982 Term: Criminal Law: Mail Fraud and the De Facto Public
Official: The Second Circuit Projects Citizens' Rights to Honest Government, United States
v. Margiotta, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 933, 936 (1983) (stating "Congress eliminated from
the original statute language that premised a violation on the requirement that the
defendant devise the fraudulent scheme with the specific intent that it be carried out by
the use of the postal system").
34 See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130; see also Kanter, supra
note 33, at 937 (stating new language stressed necessity of detecting fraudulent schemes).
35 See Henning, supra note 17, at 448 (noting that commentators have disagreed as to
whether 1909 amendment has jurisdictional requirement or substantial limitation);
Rakoff, supra note 13, at 817 (stating minimal use of mails would "trigger" mail fraud
statute).
36 232 U.S. 155, 161 (1914) (overruling demurrer and remanding case for further
review).
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scheme to defraud had to involve the mail.37 The court merely
stated that the district court was wrong when it held that the
indictment did not establish a scheme to defraud. 38 Throughout
the early to mid-twentieth century, federal courts failed to
articulate the interdependence required between the scheme to
defraud and the mailing itself to be guilty of mail fraud.39 This
inconsistency seemed to imply that the use of the mails did not
have to be an essential part of the crime. 40
In Kann v. United States,41 the Supreme Court, for the first
time, reversed a mail fraud conviction on grounds that the use of
the mails was too remote.42 The Court held that "[tjhe federal
mail fraud statue does not purport to reach all frauds, but only
those limited instances in which the use of the mails is a part of
execution of the fraud, leaving all other cases to be dealt with by
appropriate state law."43 Consequently, the Court held that the
37 See Henning, supra note 17, at 449 (stating that court did little to clarify "the
degree of interdependence required between the scheme to defraud and the use of the
mails"). But see Rakoff, supra note 13, at 817 (stating that Young was "simple unqualified
extension of federal jurisdiction").
38 See Young, 232 U.S. at 161-62 (stating necessity to also charge intent to open
correspondence via post office).
39 See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (holding that mailing does not
have to be "essential part of the scheme" to defraud); Badders v. United States, 240 U.S.
391, 394 (1916) (stating that mail fraud only had to be step in plot); United States v.
States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that statute does not prohibit scheme
concerned about money or property because concept of fraud should be broadly construed).
But see United States v. Clark, 121 F. 190, 190-191 (M.D. Pa. 1903) (stating that not all
fraudulent schemes are covered by mail fraud statute, only those where mailing is
essential part of scheme).
40 See Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8 (holding that fraud conviction supported even where use
of mails not essential part of scheme); see also Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306,
314 (1896) (stating that to constitute offense, it was sufficient if actor mailed letters he
believed would assist in effecting scheme); United States v. Seigel, 717 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir.
1983) (describing application of mail fraud statute as "seemingly limitless"); United States
v. Haynes, 620 F. Supp. 474, 481 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (stating that it is not necessary for
mailings to be an essential part of contemplated scheme). See generally Henning, supra
note 17, at 441 (discussing evolution of mail fraud statute).
41 323 U.S. 88 (1944).
42 See id. at 94 (holding that "it can not be said that the mailings in question were for
the purpose of executing the scheme, as the statute requires"); see also Dyhre v.
Hudspeth, 106 F.2d 286, 288 (10th Cir. 1939) (holding that mail fraud statute could not
have been used to execute scheme because defendant had already induced parties into
scheme); McNear v. United States, 60 F.2d 861, 863 (10th Cir. 1932) (holding that use of
mails did not violate mail fraud statute); Henning, supra note 17, at 451 (stating that
Kann was first time Supreme Court overturned mail fraud conviction based on
remoteness).
43 See Kann, 323 U.S. at 95 (interpreting meaning of "in furtherance" element of mail
fraud statute); see also United States v. Otto, 742 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating
that scheme's completion depended in some way on charged mailings); United States v.
McNeill, 728 F.2d 5, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that "receipt of pension checks were
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mailing element for the purpose of executing the fraud is "lacking
in the present case."44
Ten years later, however, the Court changed its reasoning in
Pereira v. United States.45 In Pereira, the defendants engaged in
a scheme to fraudulently obtain money from the wife of one of the
defendants and acquired the money by a check drawn from the
wife's California bank and mailed to a Texas bank.46 The Court
held that regardless of whether the defendant considered the
mailing between banks vital to his scheme "it was not necessary
that the scheme contemplate the use of the mails as an essential
element."47 The Court reasoned that, even though the defendant
may not have intended use of the mails, if the defendant had
"knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary
course of business, or where such use can reasonably be
foreseen ... [defendant] causes the mails to be used."48
Several years later, in Parr v. United States,49 the Court again
attempted to determine the relationship between the scheme to
defraud and the use of the mails. The defendants, who were
proceeds of fraudulent scheme, and as such, were clearly essential to the success of the
scheme"); United States v. Martin, 694 F.2d 885, 890 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding interception
and conversion of insurance refund checks was closely enough related to ongoing
fraudulent scheme); Henning, supra note 17, at 437 (stating that mail fraud statute has
become primary provision to extend federal jurisdiction to crimes traditionally prosecuted
only at state and local level).
44 See Kann, 323 U.S. at 95; see also United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1126-27
(5th Cir. 1997) (holding that government evidence was insufficient to support conviction
for mail fraud where it was not clearly established that checks were payments of
fraudulent claims used to execute scheme); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 359 (6th
Cir. 1997) (stating that there needs to be at least showing that mailing is "incident to an
essential part of the scheme"); United States v. Altman, 48 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding that use of mails was too remote to sustain conviction for mail fraud); United
States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 664 (3d Cir. 1978) (reversing mail fraud conviction on
grounds that mailings were not sufficiently related to scheme).
45 347 U.S. 1 (1953).
46 See id. at 5 (providing detail of fraudulent activity).
47 See id. at 8; see also Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1989)
(holding that use of mail need not be essential element of scheme to be part of execution of
fraud); United States v. Turley, 891 F.2d 57, 59-60 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that specific
intent to use mails need not exist as essential element of scheme); United States v. Reed,
721 F.2d 1059, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that showing of specific intent to use
mails not required for conviction under mail fraud statute).
48 See Pereira, 347 U.S. at 9; see also United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 443
(1917) (holding that, although defendant did not mail letter himself, he effectively caused
it to be mailed); United States v. Edwards, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 11656, at 8 (4th Cir.
1999)(affirming conviction for conspiracy to commit mail fraud wheke use of mails by
third party in furtherance of scheme was "objectively, reasonably foreseeable"); United
States v. Tannenbaum, 327 F.2d 210, 211-12 (7th Cir. 1964) (stating that there is no need
to prove intent to use mails to adequately prove mail fraud).
49 363 U.S. 370 (1960).
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public officials, diverted to themselves money mailed by
taxpayers.50 The Court held that since the mailings were legal
they cannot be seen as to have been "unlawful 'step[s] in a
plot."' 51
In United States v. Sampson,52 the defendants deceived victims
into believing that they could obtain loans or sell their
businesses. 53 The victims sent money as an advance fee and the
defendants then mailed an acceptance letter to the victims to lull
them into believing that their applications had been accepted.54
The Court held that "such a deliberate and planned use of the
United States mails... to be 'for the purpose of executing' a
scheme within the meaning of the mail fraud statute."55 The
Court distinguished the case from Kann and Parr from by stating
that "[w]e are unable to find anything in either the Kann or the
Parr case which suggests that the Court was laying down an
automatic rule that a deliberate, planned use of mails after the
victim's' money had been obtained can never be 'for the purpose
of executing' the defendants' scheme." 56
The Court returned to its restrictive reading of the mail fraud
statute in United States v. Maze.57 In Maze, the defendant stole
his roommate's credit card to obtain goods and services.5 8 The
government alleged that his act constituted mail fraud because
the defendant knew that the invoices would be mailed to the
victim's bank and later to the victim himself.59 However, the
Court held that this type of mailing was not the type that was an
50 See id. at 374-75 (requiring detailed examination of indictment, evidence, and
issues of fact); see also United States v. Brickey, 296 F. Supp. 742, 751 (E.D. Ark. 1969)
(citing Parr in holding that mailings made in usual course of business did not violate mail
fraud statute).
51 See Parr, 363 U.S. at 391 (quoting Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394
(1916)); see also United States v. Cross, 128 F.3d 145, 147-52 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that
mailing case disposition did not constitute mail fraud). See generally, Ellen S. Podgor,
Mail Fraud: Redefining the Boundaries, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 557, 566 (1998)
(discussing judicially identified limitations to "in furtherance" element of mail fraud
statute).
52 371 U.S. 75 (1962).
53 See id. at 77 (finding defendant never intended to perform promised services).
54 See id. at 77-78 (showing other fraudulent acts by defendant to lull victims into
false sense of security).
55 Id. at 81 (stating precisely what defendant purchased with stolen card).
56 Id. at 80 (finding defendant knew such delay mailing would allow him to continue
using card).
57 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
58 See id. at 396.
59 See id. at 397.
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element of mail fraud.60
The Court further redefined the type of mailing required for
mail fraud in Schmuck v. United States.61 Schmuck dealt with
auto dealers who bought used cars and rolled back the
odometers. The dealers then resold the cars to retail dealers in
Wisconsin.62 The retail dealers would then resell these cars to
customers. In order to complete the sale, the dealer would
submit a title application form on behalf of the customer to the
Wisconsin Department of Motor Vehicles. 63 Mailing these title
applications was the basis of the mailing element of the crime.64
The Court held that a jury could find that "the title registration
mailings were part of the execution of the fraudulent scheme."65
The Court reasoned that this mailing was incident to a vital part
of the scheme, which "satisfies the mailing element of mail fraud
offense."66
The Supreme Court has given little guidance in determining
mail fraud cases.67 As the cases above suggest, the relationship
required between the mailing element and the scheme to defraud
is difficult to determine. This relationship, however, is critical in
deciding whether a mail fraud offense should be prosecuted.
60 See id. at 405 (holding that mailings in this case were not for purpose of
defrauding).
61 489 U.S. 705, 707 (1989); see also United States v. Locklear, 829 F.2d 1314, 1319
(4th Cir. 1987) (obtaining documents through mail furthers execution of wholesaler's
odometer tampering scheme); Todd E. Molz, Comment, The Mail Fraud Statute: An
Argument for Repeal by Implication, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 983, 990 (1997) (discussing how
Schmuck replaced Maze with more lax requirement).
62 See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 707.
63 See id.
64 See id. (discussing essential element of mail fraud); see also Pereira v. United
States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (executing of fraud does not require use of mails to be
essential element of scheme); Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916) (mailing
has to be "incidental" to essential part of scheme).
65 See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 712; see also Ohrynowicz v. United States, 715, 718 (7th
Cir. 1976) (mailing of personalized checks furthered scheme even though checks never
used). But see United States v. Galloway, 664 F.2d 161, 163-65 (7th Cir. 1981).
66 See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 712.
67 See Henning, supra note 17, at 459 (stating that Court has failed to "provide any
real guidance as to the degree or the nature for the interrelationship between the two
elements required for a conviction"); see also Molz, supra, note 61 at 990 (stating that
"[b]ecause the Court rarely provides definitive guidance, prosecutors and defendants can
cite multiple cases supporting their view of what satisfies the mailing elements of the
mail fraud statute"); Podgor, supra note 14, at 268 (detailing Supreme Court's inability to
come to decisive decision in interpreting mail fraud statute).
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
While lower courts have consistently attempted to limit use of
the mail fraud statute, Congress and the Supreme Court have
consistently given the mail fraud statute broad interpretation. 68
Expansion of the mail fraud statute began in McNally v. United
States.69 In McNally, the government attempted to prosecute
corrupt public officials claiming that the mail fraud statue
applied because the defendants had deprived the citizens of the
intangible right to good government. 70 The Supreme Court held,
relying on its decision in United States v. Durland71 and the 1909
amendment to the mail fraud statute72, that the statute does not
include intangible non-property rights, but only covers schemes
to defraud money or property. 73 Shortly after McNally, in
Carpenter v. United States,74 the Court held that confidential
information was property and the mail fraud statute was
applicable.75
In reaction to these two Supreme Court decisions, Congress
amended the mail fraud statute by adding § 1346 of Title 18 as
part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.76 The amendment
68 See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (requiring only that deprivation be only of intangible
property); see also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 364-66 (1987) (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (stating that elements of mail fraud statute should be read independently
because Congress enacted mail fraud statue to protect misuse of Postal Service);
Williams, supra note 3, at 147 (detailing broad government interpretation under mail
fraud statute).
69 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
70 See id. at 354-55 (stating that mail fraud proscribes schemes to defined citizens of
intangible rights).
71 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896) (giving mail fraud broad interpretation).
72 See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130, amending Act of June
8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323 (stating Congress broadened original mail fraud
statute).
73 See McNally, 483 U.S. at 356-60 (stating that "money or property" language does
not limit claims as to which money or property was deprived).
74 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
75 See id. at 25-26 (holding that confidential information has always been considered
property); see also Rackelshans v. Monstano Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-1004 (1984)
(recognizing that trade secrets as property is constant with notion of property); Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n. 10 (1983) (stating that insiders have duty not divulge inside
information).
76 See Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
1346) (West 1998); see also John E. Gagliardi, Comment, Back to the Future: Federal Mail
Fraud and Wire Fraud Under 18 U.S.C. § 1346, 68 WASH. L. REV. 901, 903 (1993) (stating
that Congressional modification "blurs the scope" of mail and wire fraud statutes);
Podgor, supra note 14, at 235-36 (stating that amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1346 was to
include "intangible right of honest services").
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stated that "[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme
or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services."77 The addition
of this language enlarged the scope of the mail fraud statute
dramatically; consequently, many organized crime and political
corruption activities now fell within its reach. 78
Even though Congress and the Supreme Court increased the
power of federal prosecutors under the mail fraud statute,79 a
number of lower courts have moved to limit the power of the mail
fraud statute.8 0 For example, although § 1346 broadens the
power of the prosecutor with respect to intangible property
rights, some courts attempt to limit the application of other
provisions of the mail fraud statute.8 1 Courts have also denied
prosecutions based on insufficient evidence of a scheme to
defraud,82 and other courts have limited what a scheme to
defraud entails.8 3 Lower courts have also narrowed the intent
77 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (West 1998).
78 See United States v. Hicky, 16 F. Supp. 2d 223, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that §
1346 was created to protect citizens right to honest public service by public officials); see
also Henning, supra note 17, at 464 (stating this statute would allow federal government
jurisdiction over political corruption that was once controlled by state). But see United
States v. Mandel, 672 F. Supp. 864, 875 (D. Md. 1987) (holding that intangible right to
good and honest service by public officials not part of mail fraud statute).
79 See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (West 1998) (stating that there could be intangible property
rights); see also Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712 (1989) (holding that mailing
element of crime is not essential); United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541, 548 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that defendants mail fraud conviction did not violate ex post facto clause of
United States Constitution); United States v. Hickey, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 231 (stating that
"scheme or artifice to defraud" includes depravation of "intangible right of honest
service").
80 See McElvoy Travel Bureau v. Heritage Travel Inc., 904 F.2d 786, 788, 791, 793
(1st Cir. 1990) (holding scheme to defraud does not include breach of contract); United
States v. Mangiardi, 962 F. Supp 49, 51-53 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that superseding
indictment does not support charge of mail fraud); see also Podgor, supra note 51, at 560
(stating that although mail fraud has been used in many situations, judiciary has set
limits on it).
81 See United States v. Czubiniski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1076-1077 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding
that federal employee looking through people's records is not considered "deprivation of
intangible property" in wire fraud conviction); see also Podgor, supra note 51, at 561-62
(stating that cases based not on § 1346 still need depravation of money or property).
82 See United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 730 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that
violation of gift statute is legally sufficient basis to allege scheme to defraud); United
States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding there is insufficient evidence to
uphold scheme to defraud); United States v. Yoakam, 116 F.3d 1346, 1349-50 (10th Cir.
1997) (holding not enough evidence to prove arson); see also Podgor, supra note 51, at 562-
63 (citing examples where insufficient evidence to convict on mail fraud. But see United
States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 695 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that there was sufficient
evidence to support charge of bank fraud insufficient evidence to convict on mail fraud).
83 See United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir.1996) (stating that
Congress has not made criminal all questionable transactions); United States v.
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element, and now hold that intent to deceive is not enough to
trigger the mail fraud statute.8 4 By requiring the government to
comply with a strict standard on the intent or mens rea element
of the crime, "courts have limited the application of the
statute."85 Furthermore, while actual harm is not required,
courts do require that the government prove that the defendant
contemplated harm or injury.S6
IV. GOOD FAITH DEFENSE
A good faith defense is directly related to the mens rea of
crimes that involve fraud.8 7 Mail fraud is a specific intent crime
and, therefore, a good faith defense is vital in mail fraud cases
because it provides a complete defense for the defendant.8 8 By
permitting use of the good faith defense, defendants have been
afforded necessary protection against one of the greatest weapons
in the federal arsenal, the mail fraud statute.8 9 A pivotal
Goodman, 984 F.2d 235, 339 (8th Cir 1993) (holding that not all promotional schemes are
illegal and to prove promotion illegal government must have "objective evidence" of a
scheme to defraud); United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 100 (2d. Cir. 1987) (indicating
that not all scheme are authorized); see also Podgor, supra note 50, at 564-65 (stating that
"[c]ourts have also limited what will constitute a scheme to defraud").
84 See United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 732-33 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that there
was no intent to deceive established); Starr, 816 F.2d at 98 (holding intent to deceive,
absent intent to harm, is not fraudulent intent under mail fraud statute); United States v.
Regent Office Supply Co, 421 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that intent to
deceive, without more, does not constitute mail fraud); see also Podgor, supra note 51, at
566 (stating that "[c]ourts have also reversed mail fraud convictions premised upon an
insufficient showing of an intent to defraud").
85 See Podgor, supra note 51, at 568; see also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350,
360 (1986) (stating § 1341 would be read as limited in scope to protection of property
rights). But see Peter Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud', 19
CHAMPION 6, 7 (1995) (stating limited mail fraud statute has become more unlimited
because of congressional action).
86 See United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
intent to harm has to have been contemplated); United States v. McNieve, 536 F.2d 1245,
1246-48 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that there was no scheme to defraud or harm
contemplated); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423, 431 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that
no actual harm has to have occurred); see also Podgor, supra note 51, at 567 (stating that
in order to be convicted of mail fraud, there must be evidence of contemplation of harm).
87 See United States v. Grissom, 44 F.3d 1507, 1512 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding "good
faith" negates requisite element of intent); United States v. Lawton, 995 F.2d 290, 294 n.4
(D.C. Cir 1993) (holding that good faith belief negates fraudulent intent); United States v.
Hohn, 963 F.2d 380, 380 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that good faith belief in truth negates
intent to defraud).
88 See supra note 9 and the accompanying text; see also United States v. Gole, 21
F.Supp.2d 161, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating it is 'axiomatic' that good faith is complete
defense to mail fraud); United States v. Somerstein, 971 F. Supp. 736, 741 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (stating that good faith defense is complete defense to mail fraud).
89 See Christopher G. Green, Christopher P. Hain, Mail and Wire Fraud, 35 AM.
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question that continues to divide the federal circuits is whether a
defendant is entitled to a separate good faith jury instruction.90
A. Status of the Good Faith Jury Instruction
At the conclusion of a trial, a defendant is entitled to submit
jury instructions.91 The defendant is permitted to submit the
desired jury instructions only when he or she conforms to Federal
Criminal Procedure Rule 30.92 Although a defendant may be
entitled to a particular instruction, the defendant is not entitled
to a specifically worded instruction.93
CRIM. L. REV. 943, 943 (1998) (stating that mail fraud statute has always been "powerful
prosecutorial tool"); Podgor, supra note 14, at 224 (stating that mail fraud statute is
prosecutor's "Stradivarius" or "Colt 45"); Raphael Rosenblatt, Adam Michaels, Mail and
Wire Fraud, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 771 (1997) (stating that mail fraud statute is
prosecutor's "Louisville Slugger" or "Cuisinart").
90 See United States v. Camuti, 78 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that good
faith instruction is not required when court gives adequate instructions on intent to
defraud); United States v. Dorotich, 900 F.2d 191, 192-94 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that
defendant was not entitled to good faith instruction because trial judge adequately
instructed jury on law); United States v. Casperson, 773 F.2d 216, 224 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that failure to give good faith instructions was error); New England Enterprises
v. United States, 400 F.2d 58, 71 (1st Cir. 1968) (holding that definitions of specific intent
adequately covered good faith defense); see also Daniel J. Jonas, The Circuit Split Over
Instructing the Jury Specifically on the Good Faith Defense: A Consequence of
Superlegislature by Courts or the Standards of the Appellate Review, 61 SYR. L. REV. 83-
84 (1995) (stating that circuits are divided as to whether defendant is entitled to separate
good faith instruction).
91 See United States v. Envangelista, 122 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating
defendants only entitled to have instructions presented that adequately apprised jury of
elements of crime and their defense); United States v. LaMorte, 950 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir.
1991) (stating that criminal defendant was entitled to jury instruction regarding
withdrawal from conspiracy); Cole-Layer-Trumble Company v. Board of County
Commissioner, 1991 WL 74251 *1, **3 (D. Kan 1991) (holding that parties are free to
submit jury instructions); United States v. Durham, 825 F.2d 716, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1987)
(recognizing criminal defendant's right to specific jury charge which reflects defense
theory).
92 FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 (stating "[a]t the close of the evidence or at such time during
the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the
court instruct the jury on the law set forth in the request'); see also United States v.
McQuarry, 726. F.2d 401, 402 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that defendant has right to submit
jury instructions pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 provided that
request is timely, there is evidence to support instruction and instruction correctly states
law); United States v. Lewis, 718 F.2d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that defendant
has the right to "theory of defense" instruction provided request made timely and there is
evidence to support it); United States v. Salinas, 601 F.2d 1279, 1282 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that at close of evidence or when court directs, any party can submit jury
instructions on law).
93 See United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that
district court has broad discretion in determining appropriate jury instructions and
defendant is not entitled to particularly worded instruction where instructions given
adequately and correctly cover substance of requested instructions); McQuarry, 726 F.2d
at 402 (holding that district court has "wide discretion" in formulating jury instructions);
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Several circuits, namely the First,94 Second, 95 Third,96 Ninth,97
and the District of Columbia,98 hold that a defendant is not
entitled to a separate good faith instruction. These circuits have
held that if a defendant is found guilty of a specific intent crime,
the defendant is excluded from utilizing a good faith defense. 99
Lewis, 718 F.2d at 885 (stating that it is "well-established... that a defendant is not
entitled to particularly-worded instruction when instructions actually given by trial court
adequately and correctly cover substance of the requested instruction); see also United
States v. Uder, 98 F.3d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that district court did not abuse
discretion by refusing to modify instructions according to defendant's request).
94 See United States v. Joselyn, 99 F.3d 1182, 1194 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding district
court's instruction fairly summarized defendant's defense theory); United States v.
Dockary, 943 F.2d 152, 155 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that First Circuit's stance on no good
faith instruction is "doctrine of vitality"); United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1124 (1t
Cir. 1989) (holding that jury charges, despite not specifically mentioning good faith,
communicated substance of defendant's request); New England Enterprises v. United
States, 400 F.2d 58, 71 (1st Cir. 1968) (holding that there is nothing so important about
good faith instruction that meaning cannot be otherwise conveyed).
95 See United States v. Spoko, 1995 WL 722539 *1, **3 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
court's instruction of good faith was adequate); United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183,
1200-01 (1991) (holding that "there is no basis for reversal when the court's instructions
have properly explained the thrust" of defendant's argument); United States v. McElroy,
910 F.2d 1016, 1026 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that district court's instructions "conveyed the
essence of a 'good faith defense' instruction"); United States v. Bronstein, 658 F.2d 920,
930 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that court adequately charged jury that good faith complete
defense to mail fraud).
96 See United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097, 1103 (3d Cir. 1992) (failing to give good
faith instruction not abuse of discretion); see also United States v. Zeherbach, 47 F.3d
1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant not entitled to good faith jury
instruction in bankruptcy fraud case); United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 204 (3d Cir.
1986) (stating that error in refusing instructions will only be found "if instruction was
correct, not substantially covered by other instructions and its omission prejudiced
defendant"); United States v. Corcoran, 872 F. Supp. 175, 187 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (holding
that in Medicare fraud case, defendant not entitled to good faith jury charge).
97 See United States v. Dorotich, 900 F.2d 192, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
district judge adequately instructed jury on defendant's theory of defense even though no
specific good faith instruction); United States v. Bonanno, 852 F.2d 434, 439-40 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that instruction on specific intent preclude instruction of good faith);
United States v. Alcantar, 832 F.2d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant not
entitled to good faith defense); United States v. Solomon, 825 F.2d 1292, 1297 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding that "failure to give an instruction on a 'good faith defense' is not fatal");
United States v. Green, 745 F.2d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant not
entitled to good faith instruction because instructions adequately included specific intent
element).
98 See United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 371 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that instructions stating
government must prove defendant acted with specific intent were adequate and did not
call for instruction on good faith defense); United States v. Gambler, 662 F.2d 834, 837
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that instructions covered good faith defense request). But see
United States v. Garner, 529 F.2d 962, 970 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that there was some
evidence supporting defendant's theory, therefore, defendant was entitled to instruction
on theory); Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding in
criminal cases, even when weak, inconsistent or doubtful credibility, its presence requires
instruction on theory of defense).
99 See United States v. Lavergne, 805 F.2d 517, 523 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that
finding of "specific intent to deceive categorically excludes finding of good faith"); see also
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Normally, in these circuits, the courts will define specific intent,
without using a good faith instruction. 100 Although the court will
provide these definitions, the prosecution must still prove the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.101 Throughout
the trial, the defendant will be given a full opportunity to testify
and produce evidence concerning good faith, which will be
presented to the jury. 102 To convict a defendant of mail fraud, the
jury must find that the defendant had the specific intent to
commit the crime of mail fraud.103 In these circuits, the
defendant is not entitled to a separately worded instruction if it
spells out the theory of the defendant's defense. 104
United States v. Dockray, 943 F.2d 152, 155 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that specific jury
instruction on good faith is not "mandated"); United States v. Rochester, 898 F.2d 971,
978-79 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant was not entitled to good faith instruction);
United States v. McElroy, 910 F.2d 1016, 1025 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant is
not entitled to good faith defense instruction because trial court instructions covered
essence of good faith defense); United States v. Chenault, 844 F.2d 1124, 1130 (5th Cir.
1988) (stating that court was not prevented from considering good faith defense and
omission of specific good faith defense was not error).
100 See Rochester, 898 F.2d at 978-79 (defining specific intent in which "the
[d]efendant in question knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely intending
to violate the law"); United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1413 (5th Cir. 1989) (defining
specific intent as acting willfully and knowingly and court further describes that as
"acting 'voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do something the law
forbids"'); Chenault, 844 F.2d at 1130 (defining knowingly as "voluntary and intentionally
and not because of mistake and accident" and willfully as "voluntary and purposefully
with the specific intent to do something the law forbids ... with bad purpose either to
disobey or disregard the law."); see also United States v. St. Gelias, 952 F.2d 90, 94 (5"h
Cir. 1992) (stating court's instruction on specific intent required showing of "bad purpose"
for conviction).
101 See United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 106 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that
government must prove defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt); United States v.
Huls, 1987 WL 15949 *1, *1 (M.D. La. 1987) (holding that there was adequate evidence to
prove defendant guilty of mail fraud beyond reasonable doubt); United States v. Murr,
681 F.2d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that government presented sufficient evidence
to support mail fraud conviction); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 492 (7th Cir 1977)
(holding that government proved mail fraud conviction guilty beyond reasonable doubt).
102 See United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 372 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding court was
not in error when it did not relate defendant's factual jury charge to jury); United States
v. Hively, 61 F.3d 1358, 1361 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding modification of instruction not error
because instructions properly set forth applicable law and evidence on subject); United
States v. Costanzo, 4. F.3d 658, 66 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that jury had right to reject
defendant's good faith argument); United States v. Rochester, 898 F.2d, 971, 979 (5th Cir.
1990) (stating defendant was given opportunity to testify).
103 See United States v. Cole, 158 F.3d 166, 167 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
defendant had specific intent to defraud); United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 742 (10th
Cir. 1997) (holding that government must prove specific intent to defraud); United States
v. Goldbraith, 20 F.3d 1054, 1056 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating elements including intent to
defraud); United States v. Klein, 515 F.2d 751, 754 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding government
must prove specific intent to defraud).
104 See United States v. Cheatham, 899 F.2d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that
jury charge is valid if it correctly states law and covers requested instruction); United
States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 1220, 1225 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that instruction given fairly
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Only the Eighth105 and Tenth106 Circuits hold that a defendant
is entitled to a separate good faith defense. These circuits hold
that a general specific intent instruction may not clearly
communicate to the jury that the defendant's good faith is a
viable defense. 107 In addition, these circuits hold that a
defendant is entitled to an "instruction as to any recognizable
defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable
jury to find in his favor."10 8 Although a defendant is entitled to a
good faith jury instruction, the defendant must meet certain
evidentiary requirements to have the instruction read to the
jury. 109
described applicable law and gave full instruction of elements of law); United States v.
Ammon, 464 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1972)(stating that although district court did not give
specific good faith instruction, instructions must be taken as whole and if instructions
fully express legal principles of defense, than there is no reversible error); United States
v. Bessesen, 445 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1971) (stating instructions fully express legal
principles).
105 See United States v. Casperson, 773 F.2d 216, 222-23 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that
district court should have given separate good faith instructions).
106 See United States v. Haddock, 956 F.2d 1534, 1547 (10th Cir. 1992) rehearing 961
F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that in Tenth Circuit "general instructions on
willfulness and intent are insufficient to fully and clearly convey a defendant's good faith
defense to the jury"); United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716, 717-18 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that defendant is entitled to defense of good faith if there is evidence to support
it); United States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that "an
instruction on good faith in a prosecution of mail fraud must adequately and sufficiently
appraise the jury of the defendant's theory of defense"); Mesch v. United States, 407 F.2d
1286, 1289 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that instruction with respect to good faith defense
"must be clear and complete"); Steiger v. United States, 373 F.2d 133, 135 (10th Cir. 1967)
(stating that as long as there is evidence to support good faith defense, it does not matter
how visionary or outrageous conduct of defendant seems, defendant is still entitled to
good faith defense).
107 See United States v. Casperson, 773 F.2d 216, 223 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that
defendant is entitled to instruction describing circumstances); see also Jonas, supra note
90, at 88 (stating that defendant is entitled to good faith instruction because specific
intent instruction may not clearly show jury that good faith defense is viable defense);
Kurkland, supra note 10, at 859 (stating that jury instructions are very influential in
deliberations).
108 See Casperson, 773 F.2d at 223-24 (8th Cir. 1985); see also United States v.
Prieskorn, 658 F.2d 631, 636 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that defendant is entitled to jury
instruction if request is made timely, and there is evidence to support it and instruction
correctly states law); United States v. Creamer, 555 F.2d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding
that defendant is entitled to instruction on defense theory no matter how weak,
inconsistent or doubtful evidence is); Jonas, supra note 90, at 88 (stating that defendant is
entitled to defense where there is evidence to support it).
109 See United States v. Morris, 20 F.3d 1111, 1116 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that to
receive requested instruction, defendant support instruction with both law and evidence);
United States v. Prieskorn, 658 F.2d at 636 (holding that defendant is entitled to jury
charge if there is evidence to support it); United States v. Creamer, 555 F.2d at 616
(holding that defendant is entitled to jury charge provided that there is evidence, no
matter how weak, to support it).
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B. Reversible Error for Jury Instructions
Reversible error, with respect to jury charges, occurs when the
court fails to present a defendant's theory of a defense in a full
statement of the law.n10 The majority of circuits hold that a
district court has not committed reversible error, when, in
instructing the jury, good faith is not mentioned in mail fraud
cases.11 1 In United States v. Hunt,112 the Fifth Circuit held that
a court commits reversible error when:
(1) the instruction is substantively correct; (2) it is not
substantially covered in the charge actually given to the
jury; and (3) it concerns an important point in the trial so
that the failure to give it seriously impairs the defendant's
ability to present a given defense effectively. 113
A plurality of circuits, however, hold that it is not reversible
error when the district court fails to offer a good faith instruction
because it is the jury's duty to consider good faith evidence when
determining whether the defendant had the specific intent to
commit the crime. 114
The Eighth Circuit utilizes a similar standard when reviewing
jury instructions. 115 This Circuit evaluates the jury instructions
110 See United States v. Gonzalez-Soberal, 109 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding
that jury instructions are reversible error if instructions that were requests and denied by
party were correct, was not covered in actual instructions and it concerns important point
in trial); Trademark Research Corp. v. Maxwell Online, 995 F.2d 326, 339 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that jury instruction are reversible when they mislead jury or give
misunderstanding of law); United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1993)
(stating it is reversible error not to present defendant's theory in full statement of law).
111 See United States v. Hicks, 164 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
defendant is not entitled to specific good faith instruction as long as instructions, as
whole, instruct jury on his defense theory); United States v. Storm, 36 F.3d 1289, 1294
(5th Cir. 1994) (holding that good faith defense adequately covered in jury charge); United
States v. Rotham, 567 F.2d 744, 751-52 (7th Cir. 1977) (indicating defendant not entitled
to good faith instruction).
112 794 F.2d 1095, 1097 (5th Cir. 1986).
113 Id.
114 See supra note 95 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Orsinger, 428
F.2d 1105, 1114 (D.C. Cir 1970) (indicating good faith need not be included in jury
instructions).
115 See United States v. Sherer, 635 F.2d 334, 337 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that in
evaluating jury instructions, see if instructions advise jury of elements of offense); see also
United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that jury charge
must "adequately and correctly" cover the substance of the requested instruction); United
States v. Wixom, 529 F.2d 217, 219-20 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that court properly
instructed jury on elements of offense); United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615, 617 (8th
Cir. 1974) (stating that it is sufficient for jury charge to cover substance of offense).
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by viewing them in their entirety and determining if the jury was
adequately advised of the essential elements of the offenses
charged. 116 As stated earlier, a defendant is not automatically
entitled to a good faith jury instruction. 117 The defendant must
first request a good faith defense instruction and then establish
the same through the use of evidence."l 8 If the defendant can
fulfill these requirements, then the failure of the court to give a
specific good faith jury instruction could result in reversible
error. 119
The Tenth Circuit reviews jury instructions in a similar
fashion.120 The Tenth Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, will allow
116 See Sherer, 635 F.2d at 337 (indicating that court should see if jury advise of the
elements of offense); Brown, 540 F.2d at 380-81 (holding that jury charge must
adequately cover the substance of the requested instruction); Wixom, 529 F.2d at 219-20
(holding that court properly instructed jury on elements of offense).
117 See United States v. Haddock, 956 F.2d 1534, 1547 (10th Cir. 1992) rehearing 961
F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that in Tenth Circuit "general instructions on
willfulness and intent are insufficient to fully and clearly convey a defendant's good faith
defense to the jury"); United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716, 717-18 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that defendant is entitled to defense of good faith if there is evidence to support
it); United States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that "an
instruction on good faith in a prosecution of mail fraud must adequately and sufficiently
appraise the jury of the defendant's theory of defense"); Mesch v. United States, 407 F.2d
1286, 1289 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that instruction with respect to good faith defense
"must be clear and complete"); Steiger v. United States, 373 F.2d 133, 135 (10th Cir. 1967)
(stating that as long as there is evidence to support good faith defense, it does not matter
how visionary or outrageous conduct of defendant seems, defendant is still entitled to
good faith defense); see also United States v. Fuentes, 967 F.2d 593, 604 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating defendant is entitled to jury instructions presenting his defense if supported by
evidence); United States v. Caperson, 777 F.2d 216, 223 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating
defendants are entitled to good faith defense); United States v. Williams, 728 F.2d 1402,
1405 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting instructions on good faith should be given if supported by
evidence).
118 See United States v. Casperson, 773 F.2d 216, 223 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that
defendants timely requested good faith instruction and provided evidence to support it);
United States v. McQuarry, 726 F.2d 401, 402 (8th Cir. 1984) (indicating that defendant
entitled to instruction if evidence allows it); Sherer, 653 F.2d at 337 (holding that doctor
did not establish good faith defense).
119 See Casperson, 773 F.2d at 223 (holding that district court's instruction, which did
not include good faith instruction, was reversible error because it did not direct the jury's
attention to the defense of good faith with sufficient specificity to avoid error); United
States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716, 718 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that it was error not to give
good faith instructions); United States v. Prieskorn, 658 F.2d 631, 636 (8th Cir. 1981)
(holding that district court erred in failing to give good faith instructions).
120 See Curtis v. Oklahoma, 147 F.3d 1200, 1219 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that circuit
court will review district courts instructions to determine whether, on whole, instructions
correctly state governing law and provide jury with adequate understanding of issues and
applicable standards); United States v. Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 792 (10th Cir. 1998)
(recognizing that district court's jury instructions are not erroneous provided that they
fairly state governing law and provide jury with understanding of issues and applicable
standards); United States v. Oderle, 136 F.3d 1414, 1422 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that
appellate court will review jury instructions in light of instructions as whole).
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a good faith jury instruction if the defendant has provided
sufficient evidence to establish such a defense.121 The defendant's
evidence must prove that the defendant believed: "(1) that the
plan, however so visionary and impractical would succeed, (2)
that promises made would be kept and (3) that representations
made would be fulfilled."122 The Tenth Circuit holds that, with
respect to mail fraud cases, "instructions of willfulness, on
aspects of intent, on untruth of representations or fraudulent
statements are not sufficient" for a good faith instruction,123
there must be a "full and clear submission of the good faith
defense." 124 Upon establishing such a defense, the denial of a
good faith instruction constitutes reversible error. 125
C. Importance of Good Faith Instruction
Complex fraud theories and multiple defendants, which are
common aspects of mail fraud cases, necessitate the need for a
good faith jury instruction.126 These aspects can confuse the jury
121 See United States v. Merchant, 992 F.2d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
defendant is entitled to jury instruction on any theory of defense fairly supported in
evidence and law, and failure to so instruct is reversible error); Durflinger v. Artiles, 727
F.2d 888, 895 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding no reversible error occurred because district court
correctly stated law); Beck v. United States, 305 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir. 1962) (holding
that defendant is entitled to adequate jury instruction provided that there is evidence to
support it).
122 See United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1994); see also United
States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716, 718 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that although plan seemed
impractical in retrospect, makes no difference to defendant's good faith belief in its
success); United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that
defendant's good faith belief in plan is complete defense); Steiger v. United States, 373
F.2d 133, 135 (10th Cir. 1967) (holding that even though plan seems visionary in
retrospect, defendants had good faith belief it would succeed).
123 See Hopkins, 744 F.2d at 718 (demonstrating difficulty involved in getting good
faith jury instructions).
124 See id. (discussing need for specificity with good faith instruction).
125 See United States v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401, 1403 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that
good faith instructions should have been given on testimony of government witness);
United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716, 717-18 (10th Cir. 1984) (remanding case to
district court for failure to include good faith jury charge). But see United States v. Smith,
13 F.3d 1412, 1425 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that there is no reversible error in refusing
good faith instructions if not adequate evidence).
126 See United States v. Garcia, 77 F.3d 471, 471 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that
appellants must prove presence of multiple defendants confused jury); United States v.
Casperson, 773 F.2d 216, 223-24 (8th Cir 1985) (holding that in this case there were
multiple defendants and was very complex); Johnson v. Bryant, 671 F.2d 1276, 1280 (11th
Cir. 1982) (holding that a court should find jury instructions are reversible error when
court is "left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was
properly guided in its deliberations"). But see United States v. Coy, 19 F.3d 629, 634 (11th
Cir. 1994) (holding that this case does not present complicated scenario with multiple
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and result in a lack of understanding concerning the good faith
defense. 127 Furthermore, a jury is more likely to bestow greater
deference to the words of a judge rather than those of a defense
attorney.128 Having courts include a separate good faith defense,
is consistent with the view of holding the government to a strict
standard of intent.129 The good faith jury instruction holds the
government to a strict standard of intent because the
government's evidence must overcome a jury instruction of good
faith by the judge and not just allow the government to prove the
elements of the crime. 130
CONCLUSION
In light of the broad power that courts have given to
prosecutors under the mail fraud statute, it is only fair,
considering the American tradition of equality in the adversarial
system, that defendants be entitled to a good faith jury
instruction. Applying the good faith jury instruction will aid in
restoring balance to our criminal justice system.
Michael McDonough
defendants that would confuse a jury).
127 See United States v. Garcia, 77 F.3d at 471(stating that appellants must prove
multiple defendants confused jury); United States v. Caperson, 773 F.2d at 223-24
(holding that the case involved multiple defendants and complex legal issues); Johnson v.
Bryant, 671 F.2d at 1280 (holding that court should find that instructions are faulty when
it is apparent that jury was confused).
128 See Kurland, supra note 10, at 858 (stating that jurors give judge's instructions
special deference). But see Walter W. Steele Jr., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury
Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 82 (stating that
jurors often misunderstand instructions).
129 See United States v. Gonzalez-Montoya, 161 F.3d 643, 651 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that jury instructions demonstrated that government must prove knowledge or
intent); United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 848 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
government had to prove intent to injure or defraud); see also Podgor, supra note 51, at
568 (stating that "[b]y holding the government to strict standard of proof on the mens rea
of element of the crime of mail fraud, courts have limited application of the statute").
130 See United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1413 (5th Cir. 1989) (defining the
elements of mail fraud); United States v. Casperson, 773 F.2d 216, 223-224 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that defendant is entitled to specific instruction if evidence is there to support it);
United States v. Creamer, 555 F.2d 612, 616, (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that defendants are
entitled to instruction, no matter how weak or evidence is to support it).
